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Abstract 
 
Deleveraging risk is the risk attributable to investing in a security held by levered investors. When there 
is an aggregate negative shock to the availability of funding capital, securities with a greater presence of 
levered investors experience extreme return realizations as these investors unwind their positions. Using 
data on equity loans as a proxy for the degree of levered positions in a given stock, we find robust evidence 
of deleveraging risk. Stocks with a high degree of short selling experience large positive returns and a 
decrease in short selling around periods of funding capital scarcity. 
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1. Introduction 
The extreme movements observed in asset prices and investment flows during the 2007–2008 
financial crisis have renewed academic interest in the impact of liquidity shocks on financial markets. 
Gorton and Metrick (2012) analyse the events leading to the crisis and show how a run on repo markets 
led to a widespread increase in write-downs (i.e. “haircuts”) applied to securities accepted as collateral, 
reducing the amount of capital available to investors. Heightened perceived risk can also lead to reduction 
in capital available to investors, inciting widespread selling of securities (i.e. fire sales) and creating a 
self-reinforcing cycle that widens mispricing. (See Shleifer and Vishny (2011) for a comprehensive 
survey.) Gromb and Vayanos (2002) discuss how large mispricing can generate forced deleveraging 
through lower collateral values. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) model how financial intermediaries 
reduce their lending in downturns, limiting the amount of capital available to investors.1 Together, these 
arguments suggest that investment strategies can face higher risk during periods of extreme market 
movements and capital scarcity. For example, Coval and Stafford (2007) show that unexpected 
withdrawals from mutual funds require the funds to suddenly close their long positions, leading to fire 
sales and temporarily reducing the prices of stocks held by these funds.  
We name this source of uncertainty “deleveraging risk” and define it as the risk of losses due to a 
sudden and widespread reduction in investment positions in a given stock. This idea is central to 
traditional microstructure theoretical and empirical research on market impact.  For example, Kyle 
(1985), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Amihud (2002) emphasize how trading activity impacts 
prices and the extent of this relation is directly tied to the liquidity or depth of the market.  Our notion of 
“deleveraging risk” builds on this theoretical link by noting that the presence of levered investors, 
sensitive to extreme market movements and reduced access to funding, are likely to have a significant 
                                                 
1 For alternative channels by which asset prices can be affected by liquidity shocks and trading frictions, see also Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992, 1997, 2011), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Geanakoplos (2010), and Hanson 
and Sunderam (2014). 
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effect on security prices. During periods of market volatility and reduced access to funding capital, 
levered investors can be forced to reduce positions or may voluntarily decrease their risk exposure. This 
combination of forced and voluntary reductions in investment positions can lead to sudden reduction in 
long positions (e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007)). It can also force investors to cover their short positions 
(i.e., “fire purchases”). 2 
In this paper, we test the impact of sudden deleveraging on prices by examining stocks with a high 
intensity of short selling. Short selling is employed by sophisticated investors, who often combine it with 
leverage to magnify returns. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a stock with high short-selling intensity 
is also likely to have a high proportion of short sellers using leverage when establishing their investment 
positions. The price impact of a decrease in capital available to investors should affect all levered long 
and short positions. Long levered positions are expected to exhibit “fire sales” (e.g., Coval and Stafford 
(2007) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2012)), and short levered ones to display “fire purchases” if investors 
must suddenly close their short positions. We expect that the most levered long positions exhibit 
extremely negative returns during periods of funding withdrawals. However, because we cannot observe 
which stocks are held by levered long investors, we cannot test for negative returns from sales of long 
positions in these stocks, especially at daily frequency. Stocks with low short selling are not necessarily 
those with a higher proportion of long, levered investors. 
One might expect highly shorted stocks to generate significant profits during aggregate stock market 
decreases. Our paper shows, surprisingly, this is not the case. We find there is a relative price increase 
for the most shorted portfolio of stocks during periods of market shocks and reductions in funding. Like 
past research, we identify a negative relationship between short selling and future stock returns using 
several measures of short selling (e.g., Aitken et al. (1998), Dechow et al. (2001), Asquith et al. (2005), 
                                                 
2 “Short squeeze” is a term used for when short sellers are pressured to quickly cover their positions in an individual stock 
due to firm-specific shocks. These rare stock-specific events mostly occur in small cap stocks. We use the term “fire 
purchases” to denote events when a systematic shock (e.g., reductions in funding capital) leads short sellers to cover their 
positions across different stocks, akin to an aggregate “short squeeze.” 
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Boehmer et al. (2008), and Cohen et al. (2007)). However, this negative average relationship is 
interrupted by periods in which stocks with the highest levels of short selling experience very strong 
positive returns, which relate to events, such as those around the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 
September 2008, and to changes in variables such as the VIX index and the credit default swap index for 
the U.S. banking sector, both associated with economy-wide reductions in funding. In summary, we show 
that fire sales and purchases also happen on the short-leg of portfolios (i.e., stocks with the highest 
proportion of short selling). When levered short sellers face a shock that leads to a sudden reduction of 
their positions, stocks with the highest levels of levered investors can even exhibit positive returns.  
Given the lack of data on stock holdings at a frequency higher than quarterly, equity lending markets 
provide a valuable data source to identify stocks with more shorting by levered investors.3 By using daily 
equity lending, we can analyse how prices move after deleveraging shocks at a much higher frequency 
than previous papers.4 Our primary measure of short selling is the ratio of the value of securities on loan 
to the total market capitalization of that security on a given day, 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁. We also employ three other 
measures of short-selling intensity: (i) the ratio of the number of securities on loan to the number of 
shares that were available to be loaned, 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁; (ii) the ratio of the number of shares sold short 
to the total number of shares traded that day from NYSE’s SuperDOT platform, 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸; and 
(iii) the monthly ratio of the number of shares shorted to the number of shares outstanding, 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇.5 
We run time series regressions of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio’s daily returns based on stocks sorted 
by short selling activity as a function of the standard Fama-French factors (𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿), the 
                                                 
3 Long positions must be reported by institutional investors through 13F fillings. Short positions do not have to be reported 
to the SEC. 
4 The vast majority of equity loans are made for the purpose of short selling (Saffi & Sigurdsson (2011)). 
5 While 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 is only available at a monthly frequency, it covers a much larger period, ranging from January 
1990 to August 2013. We use the monthly volume summary files from the NYSE to compute 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 and compute 
this measure for a smaller sample of U.S. equity securities that are traded on the SuperDOT platform for the July 2006 to 
June 2012 period. 
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momentum factor, and a daily liquidity factor based on Corwin and Schultz (2012)’s bid-ask spread 
estimator. Additionally, we include specific measures designed to capture the market-wide effects of 
illiquidity as reflected by (i) indicator variables for large negative market returns on the previous day, 
(ii) indicator variables to capture the periods associated with the so-called Quant crisis of August 2007 
(Khandani and Lo (2011)) and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, (iii) changes in the 
𝑉𝐼𝑋 volatility index, (iv) changes in the 𝑇𝐸𝐷 spread, (v) changes in convertible bond spreads relative to 
their fair price (Mitchell and Pulvino (2012)), (vi) changes in the 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 funding illiquidity measure 
proposed by Hu et al. (2013), and (vii) changes in the five-year credit default swap index of the U.S. 
banking sector (𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦). We also use principal component analysis to extract a common factor for 
liquidity as an additional variable, obtaining similar conclusions.  
Overall, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that a dislocation in the ability of levered 
investors to maintain their positions coincides with positive returns for stocks that have a greater 
concentration of short sellers. For example, during the Lehman Brothers crisis, we estimate the daily 
equal-weighted abnormal returns to a portfolio that sells highly shorted stocks and buys the least-shorted 
ones is about −241 basis points, in contrast with 10 basis points during normal trading days.  
We also examine the persistence of returns for highly shorted securities and the changes in quantities 
of securities sold short following a reduction in funding. We see a pattern of higher security prices across 
several of our funding measures for up to 80 trading days beyond the initial shock. This suggests that the 
effect is not immediately reversed. We also document a significant reduction in equity loan quantities 
following periods of deleveraging for most of our arbitrage capital measures, supporting our findings 
that a reduction in leveraged short positions drives the stock return results.  
Together, these results suggest that the unwillingness or inability of levered investors to maintain 
their position sizes most likely explains the occasional strong positive relation between short selling and 
future returns and that this effect continues for some time after the initial reduction in funding. To our 
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knowledge, we are the first researchers to investigate the impact of funding shocks on short sellers, 
adding novel evidence to the literature on these types of shocks. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our data 
sources. Section 4 explains our research design. Section 5 shows the empirical results and considers 
further alternatives for deleveraging patterns. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Our primary hypothesis is that the abnormal returns of highly shorted stocks are less negative and can 
even become positive following periods of funding illiquidity. Because short sellers set up their strategies 
with widespread usage of leverage, stocks with the highest levels of short selling face higher levels of 
deleveraging risk when funding is suddenly withdrawn. When liquidity evaporates and short positions 
have to be covered, securities with a greater presence of levered investors experience a significant shock 
as these investors unwind their positions, voluntarily or not. These movements push the prices of highly 
shorted stocks upward, affecting them relatively more than those stocks with low levels of short selling. 
There are at least three nonmutually exclusive explanations for why levered investors may be unable 
to maintain levered positions during periods of capital scarcity. First, portfolio managers may voluntarily 
reduce the leverage of their portfolios to maintain a desired ex ante risk level in response to economy-
wide liquidity shocks (Kyle and Xiong (2001), Xiong (2001), Bollerslev et al. (2016), and Moreira and 
Muir (2016)). If market volatility increases, investors might choose to employ less leverage in their 
portfolio. 
Second, investment funds’ clients may withdraw capital during periods of economy-wide liquidity 
shocks (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Coval and Stafford (2007)). Such shocks tend to happen when 
there is a general demand for collateral. This does not force a portfolio manager to reduce a portfolio’s 
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leverage, but it will cause a reduction in position size if she does not simultaneously increase leverage of 
the remaining investors’ equity.  
Third, prime brokers may reduce the amount of leverage they are willing to extend to portfolio 
managers in response to economy-wide liquidity shocks. Hence stocks with a greater presence of levered 
investors should experience more extreme returns as these investors decide, or are forced, to react to a 
reduction in funding by unwinding their positions (Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)).  
Regardless of the exact reason why investors choose to reduce their investments positions during 
periods of capital scarcity, all of the potential explanations are consistent with our hypothesis that a 
sudden attempt to reduce position size can lead to aggregate short covering. If the demand by levered 
short sellers trying to buy shares to cover their positions is offset by levered long investors trying to exit 
their positions in a given stocks following deleveraging events, we would not expect any pricing effects. 
However, if the aggregate pressure to close short positions is strong enough to have a price impact, we 
would expect to observe returns being even positive following liquidity shocks for stocks with the highest 
ex ante short selling intensity. 
Our ideal research design would require identification of the portfolio weights of all portfolios that 
use leverage for both long and short positions. It is not possible to obtain this information from publicly 
available data. Instead, we use various measures of short selling to proxy for latent leverage. Thus we 
assume that short sellers use leverage in their portfolios and securities with a high level of short selling 
activity have higher presence of levered investors. These are reasonable assumptions since this is how a 
typical levered investment strategy works. The typical long/short equity strategy employed by a market-
neutral hedge fund starts with an initial investment of $X. The investor will then create a portfolio with 
weights such that the final portfolio has a desired ex ante risk level. To achieve the target level of risk, 
the fund manager will typically employ leverage via a prime brokerage relationship. The fund manager 
will use prime brokerage financing to “borrow” $LS·X worth of securities and purchase $LL·X worth of 
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securities. The $LS·X worth of securities that are sold short are captured by the short selling data. 
However, we cannot uniquely identify the $LL·X worth of securities that are purchased by the levered 
long investor. 
To support our assumption that short selling reflects portfolio leverage, we examine aggregate 
leverage measures and how they correlate with measures of short selling. Note that we must use aggregate 
measures because security-level leverage data for individual investors is unavailable. We examine the 
relation between three different measures of leverage and short selling at the aggregate level. First, we 
use leverage data computed by Morgan Stanley for fundamental long-short equity hedge-fund clients of 
the firm’s prime brokerage arm. The sample includes U.S. long-short accounts with at least $50 million 
in equity and is rebalanced every six to 12 months to keep it representative of historical accounts. Each 
fund is equally weighted in aggregate metric. Correlations between monthly aggregate measures of 
leverage and short interest are strongly positive and statistically significant. The correlation between 
changes in long-short hedge funds’ leverage and changes in the market-wide mean fraction of shares lent 
out from July 2006 through June 2013 equals 0.24. If stocks with high short selling activity are also 
associated with a large presence of levered investors, we would expect an even higher correlation than 
for the average stock. If we use the top 95th percentile to compute the correlation, it is statistically 
significant and equal to 0.34, consistent with our hypothesis. Second, we compute the correlation 
between the monthly leverage of equity hedge funds estimate by Ang. et al. (2011) and the monthly 
difference of short interest for stocks in the most- and least-shorted quintiles from December 2004 to 
September 2009, which equals 0.25. Third, using NYSE’s member organizations gross (net) margin 
account debt leverage, we find that the correlation with short interest for stocks in the most-shorted 
quintile is 0.73 (0.54). Given these significant correlations in aggregate short selling and aggregate 
portfolio leverage, our assumption that short sellers are likely to be levered investors seems reasonable. 
While we aim to assess the impact of deleveraging risk on equity securities, there is a related literature 
exploring the impact of leverage constraints and deleveraging risk on asset pricing. For example, 
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Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) show that binding margin constraints can create price gaps between 
securities with identical cash flows but different margin requirements. Likewise, Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) show that funding liquidity can have significant effects on asset prices. In particular, it 
can reinforce margin requirements, leading to large and sudden moves in security prices. More generally, 
Duffie (2010) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) show that jumps in price gaps, and hence large “tail” 
returns, are evident across a variety of arbitrage strategies including (i) CDS-corporate bond arbitrage, 
(ii) convertible debt arbitrage, (iii) merger arbitrage, (iv) closed-end fund arbitrage, (v) index arbitrage, 
and (vi) “on the run” vs. “off the run” Treasury auction arbitrage. The impact of deleveraging risk, as 
reflected by the reduction in hedge fund capital deployed to these risky levered strategies, is consistent 
with our analysis. We can show a far broader impact of deleveraging risk into the full cross-section of 
equity securities, beyond traditional arbitrage strategies. 
Deleveraging risk is also related to the notion of crowded trades (e.g., Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) 
and Hanson and Sunderam (2014)). Our aim is to extend this literature by focusing on cross-sectional 
variation in security sensitivity to the tail risk attributable to the presence of levered investors. The trigger 
that creates the tail risk we document is not measured from correlation in infrequently measured portfolio 
holdings (as by Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)) or from aggregate measures of arbitrage capital (as by 
Hanson and Sunderam (2014)). Rather, we focus directly on security-specific measures of equity lending, 
which allow us to investigate our hypothesis using stock-level daily data. 
Our analysis focuses directly on the existence of levered investors as a potential source of tail risk. 
We do not focus on a given anomalous return strategy such as momentum and instead focus on a portfolio 
that replicates the positions of levered short sellers. Under our maintained assumption that short selling 
relates directly to the presence of levered investors, we can identify cross-sectional differences in the 
presence of levered invested capital. Thus it enables us to focus on the direct asset pricing implications 
of levered positions on a particular stock following liquidity shocks. Our analysis therefore has the 
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potential to explain tail risk across a variety of strategies, not just momentum (e.g., Daniel and Moskowitz 
(2014), Daniel et al. (2012), Barroso and Santa-Clara (2016)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Equity Lending and Short Sales Data 
We obtain our measures of short selling from three sources: Markit (previously Data Explorers), 
NYSE, and Compustat. Our daily measures of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 (defined as the value of the shares lent out 
divided by the stock’s market capitalization) and 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 (defined as the value of the shares lent 
out divided by the value of shares available to lend) use data sourced from Markit, which collects data 
on equity loans and lendable amounts from major participants in the securities lending industry. 
According to Markit, the data cover more than 85% of the transactions in the industry. We have 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 
and 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 available for the period from July 2006 to May 2013. As of Dec. 31, 2010, there are 
more than $3.16 trillion dollars’ worth of stocks available to borrow and $253 billion on loan from 
702,826 reported transactions. We can compute an additional measure of short selling, 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸, from intra-day short selling for NYSE securities that trade electronically on the 
SuperDOT platform, where the vast majority of NYSE’s trading volume is executed (see Boehmer et al. 
(2008)). Using the volume summary files, we compute the fraction of daily stock volume involving a 
short seller, which is available for the period from July 2006 to  June 2012 for all stocks traded through 
the platform. 
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We also use 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 from Compustat, defined as the monthly short interest reported by 
U.S. stock exchanges as a fraction of market capitalization, which is available from January 1990 to 
August 2013 and allows us to investigate whether our effects remain significant on a larger sample. More 
detailed definitions of each variable used in the paper are provided in the appendix. 
It is important to clarify the timing of short sales and the measurement of equity lending variables. 
Following a short sale on day t, the short seller must settle the trade and deliver the securities sold by 
t+3. Equity loans are settled on the same day that a loan is initiated, so a short seller can borrow the 
shares at t+3 for delivery to the buyer and minimize his borrowing costs (Geczy et al. (2002)). Thus 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 observed on day t captures short sales that were initiated at t−3. For regressions with returns 
as the dependent variable, we use 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 observed at time t, since it is what is known to investors at 
time t, similar to the approach used by Ringgenberg (2011). Whenever the dependent variable is the 
quantity of shares shorted, we use 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 measured at t+3 as a proxy for short selling taking place on 
day t. 
 
3.2 Funding availability 
We employ several variables related to funding availability and costs of financial intermediaries. From 
Datastream, we download the 𝑉𝐼𝑋 index to proxy for changes in volatility and use the 𝑇𝐸𝐷 spread as a 
proxy for the funding costs faced by leveraged investors. Furthermore, we obtain data on the convertible 
bond spread relative to its fair price (𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇) used by Mitchell and Pulvino (2012), and the funding 
illiquidity measure (𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸) estimated by Hu et al. (2013) based on deviations of U.S Treasury yields 
from a fitted term structure. Finally, we use Datastream’s five-year credit default swap index of the U.S. 
Banking Sector (𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑌) as a proxy for counterparty risk (Arora et al. (2012) and Gorton and Metrick 
(2012)).  
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3.3 Other Data Sources 
We merge the equity-lending and short-selling data with information from CRSP, Compustat, and 
Thomson Reuters. From CRSP, we exclude closed-end funds, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), 
and real estate investment trusts (REITs) and collect data on daily returns, market capitalization, stock 
turnover, and bid-ask spreads for common stocks. These data are further merged with Compustat for 
accounting variables needed to compute book-to-market (𝐵/𝑃). We obtain institutional ownership data 
from the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum database, with quarterly holdings data reported by investment 
companies and money managers with assets over $100 million under management. From WRDS, we 
download the Fama-French and momentum factors’ daily portfolio returns (i.e. 𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 
𝑈𝑀𝐷). We also construct a daily liquidity factor (𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷) based on Corwin and Schultz (2012)’s bid-
ask spread estimators to capture the sensitivity of short selling-based portfolios to liquidity risk. Stocks 
are ranked on the previous month’s average of daily bid-ask spreads, and the returns of the 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 risk 
factor are defined as the daily difference between the top and bottom quintiles.6 
 
3.4 Commonality in Funding Availability  
Each of our funding measures captures a different dimension of funding liquidity. Hasbrouck and 
Seppi (2001) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) exploit the commonality in stock liquidity measures. A 
natural extension of our tests is to use principal component analysis to extract an underlying common 
factor for the funding liquidity variables.  
In Panel A of Table 1, we display results for the five principal components using 1,611 days when all 
variables are jointly available. We follow the approach of Mancini et al. (2013) and standardize all 
                                                 
6 In unreported analysis, we have replicated all of our empirical analyses after removing securities with a share price below 
$5. Our findings and inferences are unaffected by this filter, suggesting our results are not attributable to a liquidity effect in 
small, illiquid securities. 
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variables. The first principal component (𝑃𝐶1) can explain almost 70% of the total variance, being the 
only factor with an eigenvalue above one. These results indicate that the other common factors are 
negligible. Panel B contains the factor loadings on each of the five funding liquidity variables for 𝑃𝐶1, 
and one can see that the weightings are evenly distributed across the five measures, with each 
contributing relatively the same. In Panel C, we use these loadings to extract the common factor and 
compute its correlation with the five funding liquidity variables. As expected, 𝑃𝐶1 is positively correlated 
with all variables, with the correlation being greater than 0.6 in all cases. 𝑃𝐶1 has correlations above 0.9 
with the 𝑉𝐼𝑋, 𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇, and 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Research Design 
Our empirical approach is straightforward. For each day (t), we assign stocks using various short 
selling measures to one of five quintiles and compute average returns on the following day (i.e., t+1) for 
stocks in the bottom (𝐿𝑂𝑊) and top (𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻) quintiles. We then examine the returns of the strategy that 
buys stocks in the bottom quintile and short stocks in the top quintile to test our hypothesis; i.e., we track 
the returns of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio. While this strategy, in line with the literature, exhibits 
significant positive average returns (i.e., securities with the highest level of short selling have lower 
future returns than those with the lowest levels of short selling), our focus is on whether the portfolio 
also shows significant negative returns at times of capital scarcity. In particular, we examine variables 
designed to capture the following adverse effects on levered investments: (i) significant increases in 
market-wide volatility and counterparty risk, (ii) sudden increases in arbitrageurs’ funding costs, and 
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(iii) sudden drops in market wide returns. We also test whether the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio faced 
extremely negative returns during the Quant crisis and during the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. While 
each crisis event had very different triggers, both created a need for levered investors to reduce their 
positions. The Quant crisis corresponds with the period described by Khandani and Lo (2011), i.e., 
August 6 to August 8, 2007. The Lehman bankruptcy is defined as the period from Sept. 16 to Sept. 18, 
2008.7 Our primary empirical specification is as follows: 
𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 · 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 · 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 · 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 · 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 · 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 
                                      + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<2.5𝜎 · 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<2.5𝜎,𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 · 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 · 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁,𝑡 
  + 𝛽∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 · ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 · ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 · ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 
+𝛽∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 · ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 · ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝑃𝐶1 · ∆𝑃𝐶1𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡.    (1)           
𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 is the daily (equal- or value-weighted) return from taking long (short) positions in 
securities in the bottom (top) quintile of a particular short-selling measure (i.e. 𝐿𝑂𝑊 minus 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 
portfolio). As control variables, we use the standard Fama-French factors (𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿), the 
momentum factor (𝑀𝑂𝑀), and a daily liquidity factor (𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷) based on Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
bid-ask estimator. We also add several measures to capture the market-wide effects of funding illiquidity. 
𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<2.5𝜎 is an indicator variable for large negative market returns, being equal to one if the 
aggregate market return on the previous day is more than 2.5 standard deviations below the average and 
zero otherwise. The standard deviation is estimated from a GARCH(1,1) model estimated on a rolling 
252-day basis. 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 is an indicator variable equal to one for trading days between August 6, 2007, 
and August 8, 2007, and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 is an indicator variable equal to one for trading days 
between September 16, 2008, and September 18, 2008, and zero otherwise. ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 is the change in the 
𝑉𝐼𝑋 volatility index from day t−2 to day t−1. ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 is the change in the 𝑇𝐸𝐷 Spread from day t−2 
                                                 
7 Note that this period is before the ban on short selling of financial stocks imposed by the SEC on Friday, Sept. 19, 2008 
(http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm)  
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to day t−1. ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 is the change in the convertible bond spread measure by Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2012). ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑡−1 is the change in the funding illiquidity measure based on Treasury yields by Hu et 
al. (2013). ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦𝑡−1 is the change in Datastream’s five-year credit swap index from day t−2 to day 
t−1. And ∆𝑃𝐶1𝑡−1 is the change in the funding liquidity common factor using principal component 
analysis. We use changes in funding liquidity variables rather than their levels to capture unexpected 
increases, similar to the approach of Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
The timing of our various liquidity variables is important, with all being measured at the close of the 
previous trading day. We choose this timing convention because we want to focus on the consequence 
of shocks to funding on the performance of a portfolio exposed to deleveraging risk. Our short-selling-
mimicking portfolio is based on information available on day t−1. We assess the return performance of 
this portfolio on day t and, in particular, focus on the consequence of shocks to funding immediately 
before that return performance.8 We also run cross-sectional regressions using a panel of daily stock 
returns, allowing interactions of the various short selling and firm controls with the liquidity measures. 
Our inferences are robust to this alternative research design choice. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics. The average (median) firm in our sample has a market 
capitalization of $4.2 billion ($0.5 billion) with 56% (62%) of shares being held by institutional investors. 
On average, 18.9% of a firm’s market capitalization is available for lending, with 4.2% being on loan. 
Some stocks are heavily borrowed, while others are not borrowed at all. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is as high as 27% in 
our sample. The average (median) 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 equals 21% (21.1%), suggesting that short sales of 
NYSE stocks on the SuperDOT platform correspond to about one-fifth of trading volume. Furthermore, 
                                                 
8 In unreported tests, we have recomputed our various liquidity measures using contemporaneous data from day t, and our 
inferences are unaffected by this alternative timing choice. 
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the average value of 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is 18.2%, implying that almost one-fifth of shares available to be 
loaned are actually on loan. The average (median) annualized lending fee is 101 (12) basis points, 
showing that, on average, it is very cheap to borrow shares. But there are clearly exceptions; the cost of 
borrowing an equity security can be as high as 2,275 basis points on an annualized basis. The remainder 
of Table 1 reports information on control variables and our various liquidity measures in both levels and 
changes.  
In Figure 2, we show time-series and cross-sectional variation in 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 for U.S. stocks during 
our sample period. For each day, we plot the mean, median, 20th, 80th, and 95th percentiles of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁. 
The lower tail of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is relatively stable through time, but, in contrast, the right tail of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 
exhibits considerably more volatility. We have super-imposed shaded areas corresponding to the Quant 
and Lehman Brothers crises, and it is clear that these events correspond to a significant change in terms 
of security borrowing and hence leverage, a necessary condition for our empirical predictions. Following 
the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, in particular, there is a noticeable decrease in 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, a 
consequence of aggregate deleveraging and the imposition of short selling constraints by the SEC. 
 
 
 
5.2 Relation between 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 and future stock returns 
In Figure 3, we plot the cumulative returns to an investment strategy that replicates exposure to short 
selling intensity. Each day, we sort securities into five groups based on the breakpoints of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 from 
the previous day. We then compute equal- and value-weighted returns for the lowest and highest 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 quintiles, and the difference in these quintile portfolio returns (lowest minus highest) is the 
hedge return from exposure to 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁. The top panel of Figure 3 shows a strong positive return to this 
strategy, consistent with an extensive previous literature examining short interest (e.g., Asquith et al. 
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2005): stocks with higher (lower) short selling activity are associated with lower (higher) future stock 
returns. 
Our main focus, however, is on the occasional large negative returns to this strategy that happen 
around certain dates. Two such events occurred during the Quant crisis in August 2007 and the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy in October 2008, with both exhibiting days with large negative returns in the 
𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio. The greater volatility in the returns to the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio after these 
events is readily apparent in the top panel of Figure 3. To help isolate this effect, in the bottom panel of 
Figure 3, we plot the conditional daily volatility of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolios from a GARCH(1,1) 
model. It is very clear that the Quant and Lehman crises are both strongly associated with sharp increases 
in the return volatility of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio, with daily volatility almost tripling relative to pre-
event levels.  
To isolate the determinants of these return realizations of a strategy mimicking levered investors, we 
decompose the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio between its long and short sides and examine the days with the 
largest negative return 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio realizations. Figure 4 reports these details for the 15 (13) 
days in which standardized returns for the equal- (value-) weighted 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio are more 
than 2.5 standard deviations below the mean. The left (right) panel in Figure 4 reports raw returns for 
equal (value) weighted 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolios. Our prior is that the negative realizations of the 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 hedge portfolio will be attributable to liquidity shocks affecting the ability of the levered 
marginal investor to maintain their portfolio exposures. Thus we expect the short leg of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio to experience large positive returns, and we do not expect much movement for the long 
leg of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio. While the analysis in Figure 4 does not condition on explicit measures 
of funding — it is based only on days with extreme negative returns for the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio — 
it shows that the extreme negative return days observed by the long-short strategy are all driven by large 
positive returns of the high 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 quintile. This is consistent with the idea that the presence of levered 
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investors causes an additional source of risk: the removal of leverage in the financial system can cause 
large and sudden changes in security prices, primarily for those securities exposed to such leverage. For 
example, on September 17, 2008, two days after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and the day that 
the U.S. Treasury announced the AIG bailout, the return of the 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 stock portfolio equals 
+8.41%. If a hedge fund was shorting stocks in the top 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 quintile and had a 3:1 leverage ratio 
(i.e., $1 of equity for every $3 of asset value), it would have lost 25% on a single day.  
In Figure 5, we examine abnormal returns around the Quant crisis (top panel) and the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy (bottom panel) for 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 and 𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 stock portfolios using 
Daniel et al.’s (1997) (DGTW) characteristic-adjusted returns. Consistent with the analysis in Figure 4, 
the high 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 quintile drives extreme positive returns in both cases. Furthermore, the returns we 
plot in Figure 5 are “abnormal” with respect to sensitivity to the standard Fama-French factors plus 
momentum. To the extent that there are correlated positions across levered investors due to commonality 
among trading strategies with the standard risk factors used in the literature, the patterns we document in 
Figure 5 might be understated (e.g., Daniel et al. (2012) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2014)). 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Calendar-time analysis with 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 variable 
Table 3 reports our primary regression analysis where we report nested versions of estimating 
equation (1) using equal-weighted portfolios based on 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 measure as the sorting variable. For 
ease of interpretation, we include predicted signs for each explanatory variable. There is a reliably 
positive intercept, suggesting the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 strategy generates about 10 basis points of 
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abnormal returns per day on an equal-weighted basis. Using geometric averages, this corresponds to 
annualized returns of about 26.7%. We find a very strong negative loading on 𝑀𝐾𝑇 and 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and very 
high R2s for these regressions, similar to Jones and Lamont (2002). Likewise, Desai et al. (2002) find 
that portfolios with exposure to higher levels of short selling have high positive exposures to market 
returns and the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 factor. Given that our portfolio is a 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio based on 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, 
our negative exposure to 𝑀𝐾𝑇 and 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is consistent with prior research from earlier periods. We also 
find that the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio is positively exposed to 𝑀𝑂𝑀. (Desai et. al. (2002) show a reliably 
negative exposure to 𝑀𝑂𝑀 for their long highly shorted security portfolios.) The 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 factor to 
control for liquidity (Corwin and Schultz (2012)) also has the expected positive sign, suggesting that a 
fraction of the returns to short selling strategies reflect compensation for general liquidity risk and ruling 
out the abnormal performance of short selling strategies is due to exposure to liquidity risk. 
Our primary interest, however, is the behaviour of 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio returns during periods 
associated with deleveraging. Columns (2) to (8) examine the measures related to funding illiquidity. For 
all variables, our prior is a negative relation with respect to the daily returns of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolio in the following day. Consistent with the evidence in Figure 5, we see very 
strong evidence of large negative returns to the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolio on the days of the 
Quant and Lehman crises. For example, in column (2) of Table 3, the 𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 regression coefficient is 
−1.579. This means that, while the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolio averages about 11 basis points of 
returns per day, conditional on days of illiquidity crises, the returns are −147 basis points. This is a 
strikingly large asymmetry relative to the average return profile and is consistent with deleveraging risk 
having a very strong economically and statistically significant impact on security prices. Likewise, the 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 regression coefficient is −2.511, even more negative effect than found for the Quant crisis. 
Whilst the economic magnitude of these indicator variables is very large, it is useful to remember that 
they only occur for a small number of days (three days for each episode) due to the extreme nature of 
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these events. Turning to the continuous measures of funding liquidity in columns (3) to (7), we see that 
all measures are negatively associated with the returns of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolio. Finally, 
we compute the lagged first-difference of the principal component estimated in Table 1 and include it as 
an additional explanatory variable in column (8) with similar results. Overall, the evidence in Table 3 
provides consistent evidence that the returns to the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolio are negative 
during periods of funding illiquidity.  
 
5.4.1 Calendar-time analysis with alternative short-selling intensity measures 
Our primary analysis focused on the equal-weighted returns of one measure of short selling: 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁. There are alternative measures to be extracted from financial markets, including 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 (measurable daily for the period of July 2006 through to May 2013 from Markit), 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 (measurable daily for the period of July 2006 through to June 2012 from the NYSE 
Volume Summary Files), and 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 (measurable monthly for the period of January 1990 
through to August 2013 from Compustat). 
These measures capture different aspects of short selling, and it is important to ensure that the 
relation we document is robust to them. Our ideal construct is to know the extent of leverage employed 
by the marginal investor for every stock on every day. We have used the ratio of the number of shares 
on loan to the total number of shares outstanding as a proxy for this construct. To the extent that a firm’s 
shares are closely held, not easy to locate for borrowing, or both, 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 may classify the firm as 
having a low value of relative short selling (and hence levered investor activity), even though, at the 
margin, there might be a greater presence of levered investors for such securities. To address this issue, 
we also compute 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁, defined as the ratio of the number of shares on loan relative to the 
number of shares that are available to borrow.   
Column (1) of Table 4 reports our regression results based on equation (1) using equal-weighted 
returns of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 stock portfolios on a specification that includes all funding illiquidity measures. We 
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can observe that the coefficients for ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 and ∆𝐻𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑡 are no longer significant , being subsumed by 
∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 and ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦. To facilitate comparison with other short-selling intensity measures, column (2) 
reports the same results shown in column (8) of Table 3 using ∆𝑃𝐶1. In columns (3)-(4), we change our 
measure of short-selling intensity and use 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 to construct 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio returns. 
Consistent with earlier results, we document a reliably positive intercept, suggesting the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 strategy generates about 10 basis points of abnormal returns per day on an equal-
weighted basis. Likewise, we continue to see strong negative loadings on 𝑀𝐾𝑇 and 𝑆𝑀𝐵, a strong 
positive loading on 𝑀𝑂𝑀 but no statistically significant relationship to 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷. Of more 
direct interest, however, is the continued strong negative relation between the returns for the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 strategy and our various measures of funding liquidity. For example, the 
regression coefficients 𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 and 𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 are both below −2, suggesting that the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 strategy generates losses of more than 200 basis points on days of significant 
deleveraging. 
Both 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 and 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 are stock-based measures of short selling (i.e., they are based 
on end of day positions). In recent years, there has been a significant shift in the trading patterns of 
investors. In particular, there has been an increased prevalence of so called high-frequency trading, and 
some researchers argue that the majority of trading on the primary stock exchanges is attributable to 
investors with holding periods of less than a week (e.g., Haldane (2010)). We use data from the NYSE 
Volume Summary files to compute 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸, defined as the ratio between the number of shares 
that were sold short on a given day and the total number of shares traded on the SuperDOT platform for 
each stock. Column (5)-(6) in Table 4 reports our results using 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 to construct 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio returns. Consistent with earlier results, we find a positive intercept, with the equal-
weighted 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 strategy generating abnormal returns of 7 basis points per 
day. Likewise, we continue to see negative loadings on 𝑀𝐾𝑇 and 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and a positive loading on 𝑀𝑂𝑀, 
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but now there are much lower R2s for these time-series regressions. The loadings we document resemble 
those reported by Boehmer et al. (2008). We also continue to find a negative relation between the returns 
for the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 strategy and the Quant and Lehman crises. For the other 
funding liquidity variables, results are somewhat weaker. The coefficient on ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 and ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 are not 
statistically significant, but this might be caused by multicollinearity among funding liquidity variables. 
Using the funding liquidity factor (∆𝑃𝐶1) extracted from the principal component analysis can overcome 
this problem and allows us to examine common variation in our funding liquidity measures. In all cases, 
we find that the funding liquidity factor has a negative correlation with the returns of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 
portfolio. 
 
5.4.2 Calendar-time analysis with alternative portfolio weighting schemes 
The calendar-time analysis presented in Tables 3 and 4 are based on equal-weighting stock returns 
to construct portfolios. Asparouhova et al. (2013) show that these weights may bias inference due to 
microstructure effects, which can make prices deviate from fundamental values. This spurious noise can 
be an issue in our tests, particularly because we use daily returns in the analysis. Thus, in Table 5 we 
present results using the two main weighting schemes recommended by Asparouhova et al. (2013), which 
are shown in simulations to have minimal bias due to noisy prices. The first one, 𝑉𝑊, weighs stocks 
based on their market capitalization in the previous day. The second one, 𝑅𝑊, computes weights based 
on stocks’ gross returns (i.e. one plus their return) in the previous day. For the sake of brevity, we only 
report results using the funding illiquidity principal component (∆𝑃𝐶1) and display additional results in 
Table IA.1 of the Internet appendix. 
For all columns we can observe that the 𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 and 𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 coefficients are significant regardless 
of the weighting-scheme employed. The funding illiquidity’s principal component (∆𝑃𝐶1) coefficient is 
significant in most cases. In columns (1)-(2) we find that an increase in funding illiquidity (∆𝑃𝐶1) is 
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associated with a decrease in returns in the following period for the 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁-based portfolios regardless 
of the weighting-scheme employed. Results in columns (3)-(6) are only significant for the return-
weighted (𝑅𝑊) portfolios. Overall, our main results are robust to controls for noisy prices due to 
microstructure effects. 
 
5.4.3 Calendar-time analysis with short interest for a longer sample 
Our final supplemental measure of short selling is the traditional measure of 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇, 
defined as the number of shares that the exchange lists as being held short relative to the number of shares 
outstanding. This measure has the advantage of a much longer time series, although not at daily 
frequency. We take 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 starting in January 1990 for all U.S. securities in Compustat and 
use values at the end of the previous month to sort stocks, rebalancing the portfolios once a month. 
Table 6 reports our regression results using 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 to construct equal-weighted 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio returns. Consistent with prior research, there is a very significant positive intercept, and 
again we find that the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 portfolio returns have strong negative loadings 
on 𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 and a positive loading on 𝑀𝑂𝑀 and 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷. Over this longer period, we see 
that large negative aggregate market returns are associated with a significant reversal in the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 −
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 portfolio returns. As before, we see a strong negative relation between the 
returns of the strategy and our measures of funding availability for a much longer period for all variables 
apart from ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 in column (6).9 In the Internet appendix, we obtain similar results to those in Table 5 
when computing value-weighted and return-weighted portfolio returns based on 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 as 
a measure of short-selling intensity. In Table IA.2, we find that results for value-weighted portfolios are 
                                                 
9 The sample size is smaller when we include ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 as this variable is only available from October 2005 onward.   
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somewhat weaker when using similar specifications to those shown for equal-weighted portfolios in 
Table 6.10 
 
 
5.6 Cumulative stock returns 
So far, we have not discussed whether the impact of reductions in funding on levered securities is 
transitory or permanent. To address this issue, we extend the window over which we measure excess 
returns. This allows us to assess whether the positive returns found for stocks with high short selling 
intensity immediately following illiquidity periods reverses over subsequent periods or whether they 
persist. 
We re-estimate equation (1) using cumulative returns for up to 80 trading days. The dependent 
variable is the cumulative returns of the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 equal-weighted portfolios from t to 
t+j, where j=[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 20, 60, 80] trading days. The risk factors (𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑀𝑂𝑀, and 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷) are also compounded over the [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑗] window, while the illiquidity variables are held fixed 
at the values measured at the end of day t−1, so the cumulative return patterns are attributable to any 
reversals based on those fixed characteristics. Equation (2) summarizes our specification: 
𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 · 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 · 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 · 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 + 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 · 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 
     +𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 · 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<2.5𝜎 · 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<2.5𝜎,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 · 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇,𝑡 
+𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 · 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁,𝑡 + 𝛽∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 · ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 · ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 · ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 
    +𝛽∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 · ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑡−1+𝛽∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 · 𝛽∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 · ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝑃𝐶1 · ∆𝑃𝐶1𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡.     (2)            
In Table 7, we report the estimates found for the liquidity variables, with columns (1a), (1b) and (1c) 
showing results for the regression with the extreme negative market return and crisis-event variables 
(𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎, 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇, 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁), column (2) for ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋, (3) for ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷, (4) for ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇, (5) for 
                                                 
10 Results found for the specification tested in columns (5) and (6) of Table IA.1 are also similar. 
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∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸, (6) for ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦, and (7) for ∆𝑃𝐶1. Standard errors are estimated using heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) covariance matrices to correct for the autocorrelation in cumulative 
returns, and the lag-order is chosen using the selection algorithm  proposed by Newey and West (1994). 
For j=1, reported coefficients are identical to those found for next-day returns (i.e. t+1) of the 
𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolios in of Table 3. As we examine larger cumulative return windows, we 
find that all measures of liquidity shocks are statistically significant for the first week of trading following 
(i.e., j=5) and also for j=20 trading days (i.e., a month) except for the estimate for 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇. Even after 
three months, most estimates are still significant. It is only when we examine the cumulative returns after 
four months (i.e., j=80) that most estimates, apart from 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 and 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁, are no longer significant.  
Tables IA.3 and IA.4 in the Internet appendix shows that we obtain similar results if portfolios are 
constructed using value-weighted and return-weighted returns. 
In summary, the cumulative returns for the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio are consistently lower following 
illiquidity shocks, and these results persist for up to three months. Collectively, these results suggest that 
securities with the highest level of short selling experience positive returns around periods of funding 
illiquidity. 
  
5.6 Changes in Equity Loan Quantities  
A further test of our hypothesis that investors cover their positions after funding shocks is to 
investigate changes in equity lending quantities. To the extent that the levered marginal investor closes 
(i.e., covers) his short positions at the time of a funding shock, it should result in lower levels of short 
selling. Given the results in Table 7, if the price effects still persist up to 80 trading days after an 
economy-wide liquidity shock, we should also observe a decrease in equity loans not only on the day 
after the shocks but also for the ensuing period.  
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For this analysis, we pool all stocks in our daily data, creating a panel of nearly 4.7 million daily stock 
return observations. We employ panel regressions similar to the specification in equation (2) but now use 
changes in 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 from t+3 to t+3+j (∆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡+3+𝑗) as our dependent variable, including year-
month fixed effects and computing standard errors clustered at the firm level. Note that ∆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡+3 is 
the cumulative change in 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 between t+2 and t+3, which is a proxy for changes in short sale 
quantities between t and t−1 due to the mechanics of equity loans’ settlement dates described in section 
3.1.  
 
 
Our regression specification is as follows: 
∆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡+3+𝑗 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑇𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾
𝑇𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1⨂𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.                                       (3) 
𝛽𝑇 is a vector of regression coefficients and 𝑋 is a vector of firm characteristics that includes 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴, 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝐵/𝑃, 𝑅𝐸𝑇6𝑀, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1, 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄, and 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷. We also include separate indicator variables 
if the stock belongs, respectively, to the highest or lowest quintiles of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 as part of 𝑋. This 
is meant to capture the effects of changes in equity loan quantities for the most and least shorted stocks, 
allowing for asymmetric effects between them. 𝑍 is a vector of funding variables that includes, 
respectively, 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎, 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇, 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁, ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋, ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷, ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇, ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸, ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦, and 
∆𝑃𝐶1. 𝛾𝑇 is a vector of regression coefficients capturing all interactions between all firm characteristics 
and the funding availability measures, including main effects for variables in 𝑍, subjecting our 
hypothesis to a high hurdle rate. We report our results in Table 8 and only report interactions between 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 and the various funding availability measures for the sake of brevity. All variables are defined 
in the appendix.  
Our prior is that the removal of funding (including increased margin requirements, recall of securities 
lent out, client redemptions, etc.) will cause levered investors to close out short positions. This covering 
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pressure will, in part, generate the positive return relation documented in previous tables. For example, 
following the Lehman bankruptcy, 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 quantities decrease even faster for stocks with the highest 
levels of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 (i.e. row (1c) of Panel A), relative to the mean reversion regularly observed in normal 
times.11 To provide an economic interpretation for the −0.193 value for the 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁*𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 
regression coefficient shown in column (1c), we can compare it to the (unreported) −0.03 regression 
coefficient for the high 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 dummy variable. It implies that the speed of mean reversion in short 
selling is much larger during the Lehman bankruptcy crisis relative to the baseline effect. The only 
variable in Table 8 that does not have the expected sign is ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦. The coefficients on ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 are 
positive rather than negative, with equity loan quantities increasing following increases in the 𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 
index at time t and raising the issue of whether 𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 is a relevant measure of funding liquidity. After 
a month (i.e., t+20) the coefficients are still negative and significant, apart from ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 and ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦. 
At t+80, ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 and ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 are no longer significant, consistent with the patterns observed in Table 
7. When we consider changes of the principal component factor (∆𝑃𝐶1) in row (7), estimates are negative 
and statistically significant for all window sizes evaluated.  
Together, the results in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that the large negative returns we document for the 
𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolios are partially attributable to the withdrawal of funding by the 
marginal levered investor, consistent with our hypothesis that “fire purchases” reflect liquidity shocks.  
Another possibility is that negative shocks to lending supply could be driving the reduction in 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 that we document in Table 8. We have examined separately the change in lendable supply 
using the same approach and find a muted response. In Table 2, we see that the majority of stocks in the 
U.S. are unconstrained, with the average 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 implying that only 18% of available supply is 
                                                 
11 The unreported coefficients for the level of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 (i.e., the “main” effect) are all negative and increasing in the window 
length j used to measure cumulative changes in 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 quantities for all the different sets of explanatory variables used. 
These coefficients capture the mean reversion commonly observed for short selling intensity. 
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lent out. This is more consistent with a shock to shorting demand rather than shorting supply and supports 
the findings of Cohen et al. (2007). 
 
5.7 Possible causes of deleveraging 
Our empirical analysis thus far has established that securities with high levels of short selling exhibit 
positive returns after periods when capital is harder to obtain. There are multiple potential reasons for 
this observed relation. Deleveraging can be caused by a combination of voluntary actions of portfolio 
managers as well as involuntary actions of investors and financial intermediaries. Portfolio managers 
may seek to target an ex ante risk level for their fund. In response to economy-wide funding liquidity 
shocks or increases in risk-aversion, they may voluntarily reduce the risk of their portfolios, primarily 
through a decrease in leverage. This would cause selling pressure on long positions and buying pressure 
on short positions. Second, clients of the portfolio manager may take direct actions in response to 
economy-wide liquidity shocks and withdraw capital from risky portfolios. Such clients can be external 
(i.e., ultimate owners), internal ones (i.e., fund managers may have internal capital allocated from a parent 
entity or seed capital provider), or both, and their actions would be forced upon the portfolio manager, 
who would then need to return capital. This would make arbitrageurs reduce their notional positions, 
unless they simultaneously increased their leverage, again leading to selling pressure on long positions 
and buying pressure on short ones. Similarly, the prime broker who provides the leverage for the portfolio 
manager may take direct action in response to economy-wide liquidity shocks. Such actions could include 
explicitly reducing the leverage extended to the portfolio manager, increasing the collateral that must be 
held against portfolio positions, or both. All of these outcomes would lead to selling pressure on long 
positions and buying pressure on short ones if portfolio managers cannot put up the required increase in 
margins. 
To help illuminate the voluntary deleveraging and ex ante risk targeting, in Figure 1 we analyse the 
daily hedge-fund gross leverage and the common component of funding liquidity, finding a noticeable 
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negative association between these two variables. These changes in gross leverage may be due to (i) 
targeting constant portfolio volatility (i.e., gross leverage will decline when volatility rises, as is typical 
during periods of funding illiquidity) and (ii) systematic internal drawdown controls that curb gross 
leverage during times of funding illiquidity. We spoke informally with several prime brokers, and the 
consensus of these discussions was (i) hedge fund leverage has indeed fallen from the pre-2008 period 
(as reported by Ang et al. (2011)), (ii) during the Quant period, there were several examples of significant 
deleveraging (i.e., some funds were running at up to 15x gross leverage and relatively small, but 
correlated, price movements precipitated sudden deleveraging), and (iii) during the Lehman period, 
known arbitrage relationships broke down (e.g., convertible bond arbitrage and basis trades), which 
precipitated significant deleveraging for the funds with large exposures to these strategies. Hence 
voluntary deleveraging is likely to be a significant reason for the deleveraging risk we document. 
To analyse client withdrawals from risky portfolios, we examine the time-series correlation between 
aggregate hedge-fund flows and leverage. We obtain aggregate hedge-fund leverage data from Ang et al. 
(2011), which comes from a fund-of-funds provider and tracks leverage over the period of December 
2004 to October 2009. The overlapping period with our sample is 42 months of data. We also compute 
aggregate equity hedge-fund flow data from HFR and Lipper-TASS. We use the equity market-neutral 
style from HFR and Lipper-TASS as well as the equity long/short style from Lipper-TASS. We cannot 
find any robust correlations between aggregate hedge-fund leverage and flow data. We examined 
contemporaneous, leading, and lagging correlations. This lack of result is perhaps not surprising, as many 
hedge funds have in place so-called gates, and the redemption process often requires formal applications 
that occur on a set cycle. This suggests that external client redemptions are unlikely to completely explain 
the observed deleveraging we document. We do not have access to internal capital allocated to equity 
hedge funds, so we cannot directly comment on internal client redemptions as a cause of deleveraging 
risk. However, based on anecdotal discussions with hedge fund managers, especially those operating on 
platforms such as D. E. Shaw, Millennium, Citadel, and SAC, there are clear procedures in place to 
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mitigate losses in periods of market stress (e.g., stop-loss rules). Thus it is likely that involuntary internal 
capital withdrawal only partly explains the deleveraging risk that we document. This is also consistent 
with the results of Ben-David et al. (2012). 
Finally, we discussed forced reduction in positions with several prime brokers. The common 
assessment was that closing of short positions due to recalls is rare and stock-specific and applies mainly 
to small cap stocks. Forced deleveraging by prime brokers is also unusual. Hence forced deleveraging is 
unlikely to explain our results. This suggests that a voluntary reduction in leverage by portfolio managers 
is the most likely explanation for our observed deleveraging risk. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We explore the impact of deleveraging events on the cross-section of equity returns. We find evidence 
that deleveraging risk — the risk of losses due to a sudden and widespread reduction in stocks held by 
levered investors — affects equity returns. Using various measures of short selling from multiple sources 
for a large sample of U.S. securities, we find that stocks with high short selling activity experience 
occasional and very large positive returns during periods associated with reduced capital availability. 
Our assumption, validated by aggregate data and institutional features of how market-neutral equity 
funds operate, is that short sellers employ leverage as part of their investment strategy. We can therefore 
identify the effects of liquidity shocks to levered positions by tracking the actions of participants in the 
equity lending market. 
 The equity lending market is a natural source of data to quantify the presence of levered investors 
and the potential effect on stock prices since it aggregates the positions of short sellers across securities. 
Consistent with prior research, we find that, on average, there is a negative relation between measures of 
short selling and future stock returns across a variety of measures. However, extending the literature, we 
document evidence of occasional very large positive returns to short selling. We further find that these 
episodes of positive returns are associated with (i) discrete liquidity events, such as the Quant crisis of 
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August 2007 and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, and (ii) reductions in capital 
availability as reflected in a variety of measures such changes in 𝑇𝐸𝐷 spread, (iii) changes in convertible 
bond spreads relative to their fair price (Mitchell and Pulvino (2012)), and (iv) changes in the 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 
measure used by Hu et al. (2013). 
 The return effects following funding shocks are economically significant and persist for up to 80 
trading days for all the measures employed. The effect on equity lending quantities is also persistent, and 
we find evidence of significantly lower quantities on loan for up to 80 trading days after deleveraging 
shocks. Together, the continuation of positive returns for securities with high levels of short selling after 
periods of reductions in funding and the reduced quantities of short selling suggest that the withdrawal 
of funding for the marginal levered investor is the likely explanation for the effects we document. 
These results may help regulators and investors understand the risks associated with short selling 
and the impact of the use of leverage on their portfolios around times of reduced capital availability. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌 Daily total number of shares available to borrow from Markit divided by shares outstanding. 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 Daily total number of shares on loan from Markit divided by total number of shares outstanding. 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 Shares Held Short as of Settlement Date (SHORTINTADJ), obtained from Compustat’s Monthly Updates 
– Supplemental Short Interest File in WRDS, divided by total number of shares outstanding. 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 Daily number of shares marked as short sales on NYSE divided by total volume. 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 Daily number of shares on loan from Markit divided by the total number of shares available to be lent from 
Markit. 
𝑉𝑊 𝐹𝑒𝑒 Daily loan-weighted average fee (bps p.a.), reported by Markit. 
𝐼𝑂 % of share outstanding held by institutional investors for each firm-quarter, obtained from Thompson’s 13-
f files in WRDS. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇6𝑀 Cumulative return in the previous six months skipping the most recent month. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇 Daily stock return reported by CRSP. 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇 Daniel et al.’s (1997) characteristic-adjusted abnormal returns using size, book-to-market, and momentum. 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 Amihud (2002) daily price impact measure computed as the daily absolute returns divided by the dollar 
trading volume, all data obtained from CRSP. 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 Bid-ask spread based on Corwin and Schultz’s (2012) method. 
𝐵/𝑃 Compustat’s CEQQ divided by MCAP, computed quarterly. 
𝑀𝐾𝑇 Daily excess (to risk free rate) market return, obtained from WRDS. 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 Daily factor portfolio return to the size factor, obtained from WRDS. 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 Daily factor portfolio return to the value factor, obtained from WRDS. 
𝑀𝑂𝑀 Daily factor portfolio return to the momentum factor (𝑈𝑀𝐷), obtained from WRDS. 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 Daily factor portfolio return to the bid-ask spread factor, based on Corwin and Schultz (2012). Stocks are 
sorted according to their average bid-ask spread in the previous month. 
𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎  Indicator variable equal to one for trading days where the aggregate market return is more than 2.5 
standard deviations below its average value in the previous day and zero otherwise. This is computed using 
a GARCH(1,1) model on a rolling 252 trading-day basis. 
𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇  Indicator variable equal to one for trading days between August 6, 2007, and August 8, 2007, and zero 
otherwise. 
𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁  Indicator variable equal to one for trading days between September 16, 2008, and September22, 2008, and 
zero otherwise. 
𝑉𝐼𝑋 Implied volatility for S&P 500 options computed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, obtained from 
Datastream (DSCODE: CBOEVIX) 
𝑇𝐸𝐷 Difference between three-month Treasury and Eurodollar futures middle rate, obtained from Datastream 
(DSCODE: TRTEDSP) 
𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 Convertible bond spread relative to its “fair price” from Mitchell and Pulvino (2012). 
𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 Funding illiquidity measure used by Hu et al. (2013) based on Treasury bond prices. 
𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 Five-day average of U.S. Banks Sector five-year Credit Default Swap Index mid-rate Price, obtained from 
Datastream (DSCODE: USBANCD). 
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Figure 1: Hedge Fund Gross Leverage and Funding Liquidity 
This figure plots daily hedge fund gross leverage (𝐻𝐹 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) from Morgan Stanley for its fundamental long-short equity hedge 
fund clients of its prime brokerage arm and the first principal component of funding liquidity measures (𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝐶1) from 
July 2006 to Dec 2012. The sample includes U.S. long-short accounts with at least $50 million in equity and has been rebalanced every 
six to 12 months to keep it representative of historical accounts. Each fund is equally weighted in aggregate metric. We use the following 
funding liquidity proxies to extract the principal component. 𝑉𝐼𝑋 is the daily implied volatility from S&P 500 index. 𝑇𝐸𝐷 is the daily 
Treasury-Eurodollar spread. 𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 is the convertible bond spread relative to its fair price from Mitchell and Pulvino (2012). 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 
is the illiquidity measure used by Hu et al. (2013). And 𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑌 is the five-year credit default swap index for the U.S. banking sector from 
Datastream. 
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Figure 2: Aggregate 𝑶𝑵𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵 
This figure plots daily 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 of U.S. firms from July 2006 to May 2013 for various percentiles. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is defined as the number of 
shares on loan divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
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Figure 3: Daily Returns and Standard Deviations of Stock Portfolios sorted on 𝑶𝑵𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵 
This figure plots the cumulative daily return of stock portfolios sorted on 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 from July 2006 to May 
2013. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is defined as the number of shares on loan divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
We rank firms into quintiles and compute the equal- and value-weighted daily average returns of firms in 
each quintile. We plot cumulative returns of a portfolio that takes long (short) positions in securities in the 
𝐿𝑂𝑊 (𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻) 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 quintile. The bottom panel displays daily standard deviations estimated from a 
GARCH(1,1) model. 
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Figure 4: Extreme Return Days for High and Low Short 𝑶𝑵𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵 portfolios  
This figure shows raw returns of stock portfolios sorted on 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 for days when the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 portfolio return is 2.5 standard deviations 
below the mean. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is defined as the number of shares on loan divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Standardized returns are 
computed by dividing daily portfolio returns by standard deviations estimated from a GARCH(1,1) model for the period between July 2006 and May 
2013. We show returns for the bottom (𝐿𝑂𝑊) and top (𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻) quintiles of firms ranked by 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 and also for the 𝐿𝑂𝑊 − 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 difference. The 
left panel displays data for equal-weighted portfolios and the right panel for value-weighted portfolios. 
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Figure 5: Abnormal Returns during the Quant Crisis and Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy  
The figure show the cumulative abnormal portfolio returns of high and low 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 portfolios around the 
Quant crisis and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is defined as the number of shares on loan 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Each day stocks are sorted into quintiles, and we compute 
the mean equal-weighted daily returns in each quintile. Abnormal returns are based on DGTW’s 
characteristics-adjusted returns. The top figure displays returns around the Quant crisis in August 2007, with 
the shaded area denoting the crisis period from August 6 to August 8, 2007. The lower figure shows abnormal 
returns around Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in October 2008, with the shaded area denoting the crisis period 
from September 16 to 18, 2008. 
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis 
The table shows results of principal component analysis used to extract the common factor of the five funding 
liquidity variables used in the paper. 𝑉𝐼𝑋 is the daily implied volatility from S&P 500 index, 𝑇𝐸𝐷 is the daily 
Treasury-Eurodollar spread. 𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 is the convertible bond spread relative to its fair price from Mitchell and 
Pulvino (2012). 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 is the illiquidity measure used by Hu et al. (2013). And 𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑌 is the five-year credit 
default swap index for the U.S. banking sector from Datastream. Panel A shows the estimated eigenvalues for each 
of the five estimated components, the fraction of the total variance explained by each one, and the cumulative 
variance. Panel B shows the factor loading for each of the five funding liquidity variables. Panel C displays the 
correlations of the estimated first principal component (𝑃𝐶1) and the funding liquidity variables. 
 
Panel A: Eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained by 
principal components (N=1,611 days) 
Principal 
Component (PC) 
Eigenvalue 
% Variance 
Explained 
Cumulative % 
Variance 
1 3.403 68% 68% 
2 0.751 15% 83% 
3 0.528 11% 94% 
4 0.205 4% 98% 
5 0.114 2% 100% 
 
Panel B: Factor loadings of first principal component (PC1) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 𝑇𝐸𝐷 𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 
Loading 0.50
0 
0.38 0.34 0.49 0.50 
 
     
 
Panel C: Correlation between 𝑃𝐶1 and funding liquidity measures 
Corr(↓,→) 𝑃𝐶1 𝑉𝐼𝑋 𝑇𝐸𝐷 𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 
𝑃𝐶1 1      
𝑉𝐼𝑋 0.92 1     
𝑇𝐸𝐷 0.70 0.56 1    
𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 0.63 0.53 0.27 1   
𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 0.90 0.79 0.48 0.48 1  
𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 0.93 0.82 0.62 0.43 0.87 1 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarizes the characteristics of stocks over the period between July 2006 and May 2013 for 6,312,056 
firm-day observations. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is market capitalization measured in millions of dollars. 𝐼𝑂 is total institutional share 
ownership. 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌 is the total number of shares available to borrow divided by shares outstanding. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is 
the daily total number of shares on loan divided by shares outstanding. 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 is the number of 
shorted shares reported in Compustat divided by shares outstanding. 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 is the daily number of 
shares marked as short sales on NYSE divided by total volume. 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is the number of shares on loan 
divided by the total number of shares available to be lent. 𝑉𝑊 𝐹𝑒𝑒 is the daily loan-weighted average annualized 
fee in basis points per annum. 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 is the bid-ask spread estimated from Corwin and Schultz (2012). 𝐵/𝑃 is 
the book-to-market ratio. 𝑅𝐸𝑇6𝑀 is the cumulative return in the previous six-months, skipping the most recent 
month. 𝑉𝐼𝑋 is the VIX volatility index. 𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇) < −2.5𝜎 is an indicator variable equal to one if the market return 
is 2.5 standard deviations (taken from a GARCH(1,1) model) below the average. 𝑇𝐸𝐷 is the change in the 
Treasury-Eurodollar spread. 𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 is the convertible bond spread relative to its fair price from Mitchell and 
Pulvino (2012). 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 is the illiquidity measure used by Hu et al. (2013). And 𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑌 is the five-year credit 
default swap index for the U.S. banking sector from Datastream. Δ(.) denotes changes between day t−2 and day 
t−1. 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 4,191 510 18,300 0.26 658,000 0.00 0.00 
𝐼𝑂 56% 62% 31% 0% 100% -0.29 1.78 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌 18.87% 19.51% 12.32% 0.00% 100% 0.18 2.22 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 4.18% 2.01% 5.51% 0.00% 27% 2.01 7.10 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 21.91% 4.37% 36.68% 0.00% 100% 1.61 3.69 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 20.96% 21.11% 7.98% 0.00% 100% 0.11 4.42 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 18.16% 9.67% 21.30% 0.00% 88.73% 1.53 4.66 
𝑉𝑊 𝐹𝑒𝑒 (𝑏𝑝𝑠 𝑝. 𝑎. ) 101.37 12.31 319.06 -7.13 2,275 5.05 30.66 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 1.30% 0.98% 1.22% 0.00% 67.30% 6.42 123.55 
𝐵/𝑃 0.73 0.57 0.63 -0.01 3.81 2.36 10.43 
𝑅𝐸𝑇6𝑀 3.47% 1.15% 38.00% -77.06% 158.33% 1.05 5.98 
𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇) < −2.5𝜎 0.019 0.000 0.136 0.000 1.000 7.07 50.98 
VIX 23.07 20.47 10.97 9.89 81.00 1.93 7.68 
𝑇𝐸𝐷 0.63% 0.39% 0.62% 0.09% 4.58% 2.36 10.39 
𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 2.07% 1.13% 3.01% -1.31% 13.69% 1.83 5.69 
𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 3.99% 2.74% 3.81% 0.72% 20.47% 2.30 8.15 
𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 131.14 122.58 80.8 10.2 595.99 0.76 4.70 
𝛥𝑉𝐼𝑋 0.000 0.000 0.020 -0.170 0.170 0.52 17.87 
𝛥𝑇𝐸𝐷 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% -0.80% 1.00% 0.66 48.18 
𝛥𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 0.00% 0.00% 0.27% -3.99% 2.25% -1.46 46.00 
𝛥𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% -2.06% 1.92% -0.03 10.74 
𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 0.01 0.02 2.51 -15.92 16.69 0.25 11.69 
𝛥𝑃𝐶1 0.00% -0.01% 0.14% -1.17% 1.15% 0.79 16.43 
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Table 3: Equal-Weighted Stock Portfolio Returns sorted on 𝑶𝑵𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵 
The table displays regressions of stock portfolios sorted by 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, with daily U.S. stock returns between July 2006 
and May 2013. We form portfolios by ranking stocks into quintiles based on 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 in the previous day and 
computing equal-weighted daily returns of selling High 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 stocks and buying Low 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 stocks. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 
is the total amount on loan divided by market capitalization. 𝑀𝐾𝑇 is excess market return above the risk-free rate. 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks. 𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the return on a 
portfolio of high book-to-market (value) minus low book-to-market (growth) stocks. 𝑀𝑂𝑀 is the return on a portfolio 
of prior winners minus the return on a portfolio of prior losers. And 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 is the return on a portfolio of high-
spread minus low-spread stocks. 𝐷Ret(MKT)<2.5𝜎 is an indicator variable equal to one if the standardized market return 
in the previous day is 2.5 standard deviations below (above) the mean. 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 is an indicator variable equal to one 
in the period between August 6 and August 8, 2007, and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 is an indicator variable equal to 
one in the period between September 16 and September 18, 2008, and zero otherwise. 𝛥𝑇𝐸𝐷 is the daily change in 
the Treasury-Eurodollar spread in the previous day. 𝛥𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 is the convertible bond spread relative to its fair price 
from Mitchell and Pulvino (2012). 𝛥𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 is the illiquidity measure used by Hu et al. (2013), 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 the change 
in Datastream’s U.S. Banking Sector credit default swap index, and 𝛥𝑃𝐶1 is the principal component from the funding 
liquidity variables above. Returns and risk factors 𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑀𝑂𝑀 and 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 are measured at period t, 
while other explanatory variables are measured at period t−1. We report White-adjusted standard deviations in 
brackets and significance levels are indicated as follows: ***(**)=significant at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
Coeff. 
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 0.094*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.105*** 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] 
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  - -0.816*** -0.830*** -0.801*** -0.815*** -0.811*** -0.811*** -0.813*** -0.808*** 
  [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.020] [0.023] 
𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 - -0.786*** -0.779*** -0.786*** -0.786*** -0.795*** -0.807*** -0.781*** -0.805*** 
  [0.045] [0.045] [0.044] [0.045] [0.046] [0.046] [0.045] [0.047] 
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 - -0.052 -0.058 -0.046 -0.043 -0.065 -0.059 -0.052 -0.069 
  [0.050] [0.048] [0.049] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] 
𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 0.216*** 0.208*** 0.222*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 
  [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷  + 0.042** 0.048*** 0.034* 0.044** 0.045** 0.046** 0.039** 0.046** 
  [0.019] [0.018] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] 
𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎 -  -0.354***      -0.320*** 
   [0.124]      [0.118] 
𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇  -  -1.579***      -1.601*** 
   [0.063]      [0.092] 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 -  -2.511***      -1.885*** 
   [0.275]      [0.178] 
𝛽∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 -   -4.851***      
    [0.921]      
𝛽∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 -    -1.267***     
     [0.360]     
𝛽∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇  -     -0.208**    
      [0.092]    
𝛽∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸  -      -0.246***   
       [0.075]   
𝛽∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 -       -1.294**  
        [0.656]  
𝛽∆𝑃𝐶1 -        -0.955*** 
         [0.153] 
# Days  1,756 1,756 1,755 1,755 1,747 1,606 1,751 1,594 
Adj. R2  0.868 0.876 0.873 0.872 0.869 0.869 0.870 0.881 
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Table 4: Equal-Weighted Stock Portfolio Returns sorted on Additional Proxies for Short-
Selling Intensity 
The table shows regressions of equal-weighted stock portfolio returns sorted on different proxies of short-selling 
intensity, 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 and 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸, using daily U.S. stock returns between July 2006 and 
May 2013. We rank stocks into quintiles based on values of short-selling proxies in the previous day and compute 
returns of the portfolio that sells high short-selling intensity stocks and buys low short-selling intensity stocks. 
𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is the total amount on loan divided by market capitalization; 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁, defined as the number of 
shares on loan divided by the number of shares available to borrow; and 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸, the number of shares 
traded short divided by the total number of traded shares on the NYSE SuperDOT system. 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 is 
only available for the July 2006 to June 2012 period. Returns and risk factors 𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑀𝑂𝑀 and 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 are measured at period t, while other explanatory variables are measured at period t−1. Explanatory 
variables are the same as in Table 3. We report White-adjusted standard deviations in brackets and significance 
levels are indicated as follows: ***(**)=significant at the 1% (5%) level. 
Short-Selling Intensity Variable 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 
Coeff. 
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.015] [0.016] 
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 - -0.807*** -0.808*** -0.612*** -0.612*** -0.098*** -0.103*** 
  [0.022] [0.023] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022] 
𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 - -0.801*** -0.805*** -0.703*** -0.702*** -0.188*** -0.201*** 
  [0.047] [0.047] [0.045] [0.045] [0.048] [0.051] 
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 - -0.068 -0.069 -0.059 -0.059 0.023 0.035 
  [0.049] [0.050] [0.043] [0.045] [0.045] [0.048] 
𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
  [0.024] [0.024] [0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.028] 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 0.046** 0.046** -0.014 -0.015 0.067*** 0.071*** 
  [0.019] [0.020] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎 - -0.285** -0.320*** -0.152 -0.168 0.005 -0.062 
  [0.116] [0.118] [0.119] [0.119] [0.149] [0.155] 
𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 - -1.588*** -1.601*** -2.130*** -2.134*** -2.250*** -2.270*** 
  [0.087] [0.092] [0.348] [0.353] [0.628] [0.639] 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 - -2.135*** -1.885*** -2.297*** -2.256*** -1.629*** -1.126*** 
  [0.367] [0.178] [0.525] [0.468] [0.270] [0.252] 
𝛽∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 - -3.897***  -2.923***  -1.898  
  [0.886]  [0.888]  [1.182]  
𝛽∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 - -0.455  -0.520*  -0.188  
  [0.364]  [0.312]  [0.402]  
𝛽∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 - -0.166  -0.166*  -0.166*  
  [0.103]  [0.091]  [0.098]  
𝛽∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 - -0.136**  -0.150**  0.193**  
  [0.066]  [0.061]  [0.097]  
𝛽∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 - -1.236*  -0.698  -1.703***  
  [0.704]  [0.533]  [0.452]  
𝛽∆𝑃𝐶1 -  -0.955***  -0.808***  -0.395** 
   [0.153]  [0.149]  [0.190] 
# Days  1,594 
1,594 
 
1,594 1,594 1,467 1,467 
Adj. R2  0.882 0.881 0.874 0.874 0.198 0.167 
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Table 5: Value-Weighted and Return-Weighted Stock Portfolio Returns sorted on Proxies for 
Short-Selling Intensity 
The table shows regressions of value-weighted (VW) and return-weighted (RW) stock portfolio returns sorted on 
alternative proxies of short-selling intensity, 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 and 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸, using daily U.S. 
stock returns between July 2006 and May 2013. We rank stocks into quintiles based on values of short-selling 
proxies in the previous day and compute returns of the portfolio that sells high short-selling intensity stocks and 
buys low short-selling intensity stocks. Value-weighted portfolios are constructed using a stock’s market 
capitalization in the previous day to form weights, while return-weighted (RW) portfolios use a stock’s gross return 
in the previous day as in Asparouhova et al. (2013). 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is the total amount on loan divided by market 
capitalization; 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁, defined as the number of shares on loan divided by the number of shares available 
to borrow; and 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸, the number of shares traded short divided by the total number of traded shares 
on the NYSE SuperDOT system. 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 is only available for the July 2006 to June 2012 period. 
Returns and risk factors 𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑀𝑂𝑀 and 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 are measured at period t, while other explanatory 
variables are measured at period t−1. Explanatory variables are described in Table 3. We report White-adjusted 
standard deviations in brackets and significance levels are indicated as follows: ***(**)=significant at the 1% 
(5%) level. 
 
Short-Selling Intensity Variable 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑍𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 
Portfolio Weighting 𝑉𝑊 𝑅𝑊 𝑉𝑊 𝑅𝑊 𝑉𝑊 𝑅𝑊 
Coeff. 
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
  [0.013] [0.015] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] 
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  - -0.582*** -0.793*** -0.261*** -0.677*** -0.085*** -0.099*** 
  [0.024] [0.025] [0.019] [0.024] [0.025] [0.023] 
𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 - -0.567*** -0.630*** -0.728*** -0.611*** -0.259*** -0.195*** 
  [0.046] [0.052] [0.043] [0.055] [0.058] [0.049] 
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 - -0.020 -0.053 -0.167*** -0.093* 0.002 0.032 
  [0.047] [0.057] [0.045] [0.054] [0.048] [0.046] 
𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 0.247*** 0.179*** 0.279*** 0.192*** 0.154*** 0.083*** 
  [0.022] [0.026] [0.019] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 0.001 0.047** -0.033* 0.013 0.019 0.043*** 
  [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.013] [0.014] 
𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎 - -0.210 -0.268** -0.018 -0.204 -0.047 -0.029 
  [0.134] [0.122] [0.111] [0.129] [0.162] [0.130] 
𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇  - -1.414*** -1.590*** -2.019*** -2.221*** -1.754*** -2.268*** 
  [0.143] [0.080] [0.445] [0.295] [0.418] [0.559] 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁  - -1.553*** -2.011*** -2.269*** -2.646*** -1.010*** -1.066*** 
  [0.209] [0.182] [0.626] [0.485] [0.335] [0.273] 
𝛽∆𝑃𝐶1 - -0.818*** -0.993*** -0.220 -0.934*** -0.182 -0.403** 
  [0.153] [0.165] [0.146] [0.170] [0.216] [0.183] 
# Days  1,594 1,594 1,594 1,594 1,467 1,467 
Adj. R2  0.839 0.852 0.831 0.847 0.256 0.170 
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Table 6: Equal-Weighted Stock Portfolios sorted on 𝑺𝑯𝑶𝑹𝑻 𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑻 (1990–2013 
The table displays regressions of stock portfolios sorted on 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇, with daily U.S. stock returns 
between January 1990 and August 2013. We form portfolios by ranking stocks into quintiles based on 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 at the end of the previous month and carrying these ranks forward daily until the beginning 
of the next month. Our dependent variable is the equal-weighted daily return of selling high 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 
stocks and buying low 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 stocks. 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 is the number of shares sold short 
divided by the total number of outstanding shares. Returns and risk factors 𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑀𝑂𝑀 and 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 are measured at period t, while other explanatory variables are measured at period t−1. Explanatory 
variables are the same as in Table 3 and defined in the appendix. We report White-adjusted standard deviations in 
brackets and significance levels are indicated as follows: ***(**)=statistical significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
Coeff. 
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.079*** 0.034*** 0.078*** 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.010] 
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  - -0.738*** -0.747*** -0.736*** -0.737*** -0.797*** -0.737*** -0.802*** 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.017] [0.010] [0.016] 
𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 - -0.515*** -0.514*** -0.516*** -0.515*** -0.829*** -0.521*** -0.813*** 
  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.036] [0.023] [0.033] 
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 - -0.277*** -0.278*** -0.276*** -0.275*** 0.002 -0.282*** 0.007 
  [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.039] [0.019] [0.035] 
𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 0.100*** 0.094*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.170*** 0.102*** 0.159*** 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.021] [0.013] [0.019] 
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷  + 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.018] [0.008] [0.016] 
𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎 -  -0.303***      
   [0.080]      
𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇  -  -1.610***      
   [0.311]      
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 -  -2.160***      
   [0.208]      
𝛽∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 -   -2.185***     
    [0.647]     
𝛽∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 -    -0.558***    
     [0.174]    
𝛽∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇  -     -0.159**   
      [0.074]   
𝛽∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 -      -0.038  
       [0.026]  
𝛽∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 -       -1.206** 
        [0.593] 
# Days  5,964 5,964 5,963 5,963 1,965 5,689 2,427 
Adj. R2  0.756 0.761 0.757 0.757 0.877 0.753 0.879 
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Table 7: Cumulative Returns of Equal-Weighted Stock Portfolios sorted on 𝑶𝑵𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵 
The table displays regressions of stock portfolio returns sorted by 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, using daily U.S. stock returns between July 2006 and May 2013 and based on 
equation (2) in the text. The dependent variable 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 is the cumulative returns from t to t+j after portfolio formation. We form portfolios by ranking stocks 
into quintiles based on 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 in the previous day and computing equal-weighted daily returns of selling high 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 stocks and buying low 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 
stocks. 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 is the total amount on loan divided by market capitalization. 𝑀𝐾𝑇 is the excess market return above the risk-free rate. 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the return on 
a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks. 𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the return on a portfolio of high book-to market (value) minus low book-to-
market (growth) stocks. 𝑀𝑂𝑀 is the return on a portfolio of prior winners minus the return on a portfolio of prior losers. And 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 is the return on a 
portfolio of high-spread minus low-spread stocks. 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<2.5𝜎 is an indicator variable equal to one if the standardized market return in the previous day is 
2.5 standard deviations below (above) the mean. 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 is an indicator variable equal to one in the period between August 6 and August 8, 2007, and zero 
otherwise. 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 is an indicator variable equal to one in the period between September 16 and September 18, 2008, and zero otherwise. 𝛥𝑉𝐼𝑋 is the daily 
change in the 𝑉𝐼𝑋 volatility index.  𝛥𝑇𝐸𝐷 is the daily change in the Treasury-Eurodollar spread in the previous day. 𝛥𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 is the daily change in the 
spread of convertible bonds relative to their fair price from Mitchell and Pulvino (2012). 𝛥𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 is the illiquidity measure used by Hu et al. (2013), 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑌 
is the change in five year credit default swap prices for the U.S. banking sector, and 𝛥𝑃𝐶1 is the change in the first principal component of funding liquidity 
variables estimated in Table 3. Returns and risk factors 𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑀𝑂𝑀 and 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 are measured at period t, while other explanatory variables are 
measured at period t−1. We report HAC standard errors in brackets using the optimum lag-selection algorithm proposed by Newey and West (1994). 
Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***(**)=significant at the 1% (5%) level 
 
t+j 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)
<−2.5𝜎
 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 ∆𝑃𝐶1 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 -0.354*** -1.579*** -2.511*** -4.851*** -1.267*** -0.208*** -0.246*** -1.294** -0.955*** 
2 -0.501*** -3.079*** -4.544*** -8.436*** -1.751** -0.247* -0.275** -2.638* -1.479*** 
3 -0.706*** -4.056*** -6.041*** -10.110*** -2.232*** -0.453** -0.374** -3.687** -1.870*** 
4 -0.681** -3.974*** -6.510*** -12.239*** -3.065*** -0.564** -0.322* -4.848** -2.307*** 
5 -0.783** -3.102*** -6.956*** -14.375*** -3.501*** -0.568* -0.531** -5.215** -2.735*** 
20 -3.050*** -0.651 -5.281* -17.012*** -4.178** -1.423*** -0.691** -16.617*** -4.530*** 
60 -3.647*** -2.729 -7.128** -24.778*** -4.625*** -1.321*** -0.207 -17.904** -5.602*** 
80 1.021 -1.803* -6.409** 4.641 -3.768 0.123 0.817 -3.861 0.647 
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Table 8: Panel Regressions of Changes in 𝑶𝑵𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵 of Individual Stocks as a Function of Funding Liquidity Proxies and Crisis Indicator 
Variables 
The table displays selected coefficients of panel data regressions of changes in equity loan quantities between July 2006 and May 2013, based on equation (3) 
in the text. The dependent variable is ∆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁i,t+3+j, defined as the difference in 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 between day t+3+j and t+3, which captures short selling activity 
between t+j and t+j-1. Explanatory variables include 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, defined as the total amount on loan divided by market capitalization on day t−1; 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, an indicator variable to one if the stock is on the top quintile of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, zero otherwise; 𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, an indicator variable equal to 
one if the stock belongs to the bottom quintile of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, zero otherwise; crisis-indicator variables; funding liquidity variables; and controls. We also interact 
all control variables, 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁, and 𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 with the crisis-indicator variables and funding liquidity variables. The control variables 
are 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝐵/𝑃, 𝑅𝐸𝑇6𝑀, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷, and 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄. Each column reports coefficients of interactions of 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 with crisis indicators or 
funding liquidity variable. 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 is an indicator variable equal to one in the period between August 6 and August 8, 2007, and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 is 
an indicator variable equal to one in the period between September 16 and September 18, 2008, and zero otherwise. 𝛥𝑉𝐼𝑋 is the daily change in the 𝑉𝐼𝑋 
volatility index. 𝛥𝑇𝐸𝐷 is the daily change in the treasury-Eurodollar spread in the previous day. 𝛥𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 is the daily change in the spread of convertible 
bonds relative to their fair price from Mitchell and Pulvino (2012). 𝛥𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 is the illiquidity measure used by Hu et al. (2013), 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑌 is the change in five-
year credit default swap prices for the U.S. banking sector, and 𝛥𝑃𝐶1 is the change in the first principal component of funding liquidity variables estimated in 
Table 1. All regressions include year-month fixed-effects, and we report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in brackets. Significance levels are 
indicated as follows: *** (**)+statistical significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
   Liquidity Interactions of 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 with Liquidity Variable  
 Variable t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+20 t+60 t+80 
(1a) 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑀𝐾𝑇)<−2.5𝜎 -0.004 -0.001 -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.022* -0.176*** -0.266*** -0.223*** 
(1b) 𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑁𝑇 -0.144*** -0.309*** -0.527*** -0.693*** -0.760*** -0.792*** -0.382** -0.306* 
(1c) 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 -0.193*** -0.371*** -0.535*** -0.698*** -0.841*** -1.874*** -3.476*** -3.900*** 
(2) ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.034 -0.136*** -0.191*** -0.252*** -0.416*** -0.984*** -1.761*** -1.737*** 
(3) ∆𝑇𝐸𝐷 -0.034*** -0.050*** -0.067*** -0.083*** -0.098*** -0.282*** -0.618*** -0.738*** 
(4) ∆𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑇 -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.102*** -0.180*** -0.196*** 
(5) ∆𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑆𝐸 -0.005 -0.010** -0.020*** -0.008 0.005 0.013 0.017 -0.002 
(6) ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆5𝑦 0.065*** 0.086*** 0.097*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.194*** 0.054** -0.007 
(7) ∆𝑃𝐶1 -0.021*** -0.034*** -0.053*** -0.068*** -0.117*** -0.281*** -0.578*** -0.616*** 
 
